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Abstract  
 
A decade ago, the arm’s length principle on which transfer pricing rules and practices are based, was 
entrenched, and suggestions for change minimal and largely dismissed by practitioners. In this article 
we discuss more recent calls for a change in approach, many of which focus on some form of 
formulary apportionment. While there is an increasing body of academic literature on formulary 
apportionment, it is much less referred to in the practitioner literature and has received less focus in 
the context of tax practitioners. We present evidence from a longitudinal study, of a change in attitude 
among senior transfer pricing professionals, from strong support for arm’s length pricing coupled with 
a dismissal of formulary apportionment, towards greater willingness to raise the limitations of arm’s 
length pricing, coupled with a muted acceptance, and application, of some formulary approaches. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Established transfer pricing practices rest on two widely accepted fundamental principles; firstly, 
separate treatment of parts of a multinational enterprise (MNE) that have a presence in separate tax 
jurisdictions (separate accounting) and secondly, the arm’s length principle (ALP).  Notwithstanding 
that the ALP is insufficiently underpinned by a coherent theory1, the principle, based on what 
unrelated third parties would do, remains the cornerstone of tax transfer pricing in most countries. 
However, increasingly, attention is being paid to its short-comings. While there are differing views on 
how to address these, there has been an increase in calls for a change to formulary apportionment, the 
allocation of the profits of an MNE to each taxing jurisdiction according to a predetermined formula.2 
There is a growing body of academic literature on formulary apportionment, and other alternatives to 
the ALP, including destination-based cash flow tax3 and speculatively, a residence based formulary 
apportionment system4. However, among those calling for a change to a formulary approach it has 
been observed that senior officials and practitioners have “strenuously opposed replacing current 
transfer pricing rules with a formulary system, and there is no indication that this opposition is 
weakening.”5  
 
 
* Lecturer in Accounting, University of Bangor 
** Professor of Taxation and Accounting, University of Exeter. Lynne Oats gratefully acknowledges the support of 
the Economic and Social Research Council under grant reference ES/S00713X/1 
1 S.C. Morse, “Seeking Comparables in Patents and Tax” (2019) Revenue Litigation Brief 37.  
2 Evidence of a shift in attitude in favour of formulary apportionment is limited, although occasionally it is 
referred to as a given, but unsubstantiated. For example, Self reports that the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group 
on Responsible Tax report that in a seminar held by the APPG with academics and other stakeholders there was 
broad support for formula apportionment overseen by a global body; although there was no apparent 
explanatory support for this. H. Self “Report of the all-party parliamentary group on responsible tax on the 
OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit-shifting project” [2016] BTR 407.  
3 A. Auerbach, M.P. Devereux. M. Keen and J. Vella, Destination-based cash flow taxation, Said Business 
School Research Paper (2017). 
4 W. Cui, “Residence-based formulary apportionment: (In)feasibility and Implications”, (2018) Tax Law Review 
551. 
5 M. Durst, “A practical approach to a transition to formulary apportionment”  in S. Picciotto (ed)  Taxing 
Multinational Enterprises as Unitary Firms, (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2017) 49. 
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This article contributes to this ongoing debate, firstly by reviewing and considering some of the 
theoretical arguments for, and concerns about, formulary apportionment. Then, within the context of 
that debate, we present and discuss qualitative data from 34 interviews with international tax 
practitioners working at the most senior level in respect of transfer pricing in the UK and the US. The 
interviews took place in 2006 and 2016/17, with overlapping interviewees, allowing us to isolate 
changes in attitude over a period of time in which there was a change in the profile of transfer pricing: 
it moved from being seen as a technical specialism of interest to some tax practitioners, to an area of 
much wider interest, subject to increasing media scrutiny. Specifically, our longitudinal data shows 
that there has been a weakening of confidence in, and increased frustration with, the ALP among 
senior transfer pricing professionals, and a loosening in the strenuous opposition to formulary 
apportionment.  
 
The next section discusses the transfer pricing environment, drawing on literature that charts the 
development of the evolving ALP. Much of this highlights the importance of the role of international 
consensus on the ALP, and how the strength of this consensus has fluctuated over time. This provides 
context to underpin the subsequent discussion of the large body of literature on calls for reform and a 
move to formulary apportionment. It also provides context for the interviews carried out in 2006 and 
2016/17. We then discuss the evolving attitudes of senior transfer pricing practitioners to these issues. 
The changing challenges that we raise and discuss suggest areas for attention and future research. 
 
 
Background and related literature 
 
Transfer pricing background  
The ALP, based on the benchmark of what an independent enterprise would do, dates back to the 
1930s6  and the vagueness of the principle has allowed it to evolve and be reinterpreted over time. The 
OECD has been one of the most important influences in building consensus for the ALP, diffusing it 
through its guidelines and model convention7. In 1992 it appeared that international consensus on 
arm’s length transfer pricing, based on “the legal fiction of the separate entity approach”8 was under 
threat, jeopardized by the US issuing new transfer pricing regulations, with a move away from basing 
the ALP on comparable transactions, to looking at comparable profits. In response, an OECD Task 
Group worked with the US Treasury to amend the US regulations and to reissue the OECD 
Guidelines9.  A major effort of the OECD was to build consensus and avoid the US defecting from 
international cooperation built around the ALP.10  
 
In 1995 the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations 
were reissued (OECD 1995 Guidelines) and the chapter on the ALP “reaffirm[ed] its status as the 
international standard.”11 The OECD 1995 Guidelines set out five acceptable pricing methods; the 
preferred method being the use of a comparable uncontrolled price, requiring the identification of an 
identical, or very similar, transaction between unrelated parties, although in practice, with a small 
handful of exceptions, there will not be a directly comparable price12. The profit split approach was 
 
6 S. Picciotto, “International taxation and intrafirm pricing in transnational corporate groups” (1992) Accounting 
Organizations and Society 759. 
7 C.Radaelli. “Game theory and institutional entrepreneurship: transfer pricing and the search for coordination in 
international tax policy” (1998) Policy Studies Journal 603. 
8 E. Baistrocchi, “The transfer pricing problem: a global proposal for simplification” (2006) Tax Lawyer 4. 
9 L. Eden, T. Dacin and W. Wan, “Standards across borders: crossborder diffusion of the arm’s length standard 
in North America” (2001) Accounting Organizations and Society 1. 
10 Radaelli above fn 7. 
11 Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations. Report of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris: OECD Publishing, 1995 at I-1. 
12 See for example M.C.Durst and R.E. Culbertson, “Clearing away the sand: retrospective methods and 
prospective documentation in transfer pricing today”(2003) Tax Law Review 39; J. Grocott, “Battered and 
bruised but still standing” (2009) International Tax Review 12; A. Vega “International governance through soft 
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listed at this time as the method of “last resort”13: Some countries objected to the inclusion of the 
profit split method as it did not rely on comparables14. This inclusion was largely done by framing the 
ALP in broad terms: the OECD guidelines and US regulation were generally consistent in approach, 
but with differences in emphasis. Therefore “an apparent consensus was maintained, by the insistence 
that all these methods comply with the arm’s length principle.”15 Following  publication of the 1995 
OECD Guidelines there was a “torrent”16 of different, often inconsistent national rules, falling within 
the broad ambit of the ALP. A 2006 survey reported “a significant shift towards broader acceptance of 
the [ALP} on a basis consistent with the OECD Guidelines”17 albeit with a degree of divergence in 
approach between countries.  
 
In addition to the maintenance of international consensus, the ambiguity of the ALP also offers the 
advantage of flexibility to cover very different transactions and situations. However, the disadvantage 
of such flexibility is the consequent lack of certainty as to whether transfer prices will be acceptable to 
the relevant tax authorities. This is, of course, problematic within large, highly integrated MNEs, 
where there are interdependencies and transactions that would not arise in an arm’s length situation 
and particularly when where there are intangibles.18 Determining appropriate transfer prices became a 
fact intensive and context-specific process, requiring the maintenance of large amounts of 
documentation, including functional analysis and risk analysis, and economic analysis of databases as 
evidence to justify the prices used, with varying documentation requirements in different countries. 
The subjectivity in applying the ALP created scope for disagreement between taxpayers and tax 
authorities, but also between different tax authorities and indeed, different views between those in the 
same tax authority or same advisory firm or in-house tax department. The prospect of disputes, double 
taxation, tax penalties as well as negative publicity began to increase at this time. Disputes between 
taxpayers and tax authorities, or between different tax authorities, were protracted under the Mutual 
Agreement Procedure (MAP) and there was no obligation on tax authorities to reach agreement.  The 
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) mechanism, used to obtain tax authority agreement was seen as 
costly and time consuming.19  Although MNE applications to use this procedure vary by industry 
sector, only a small number of MNEs proceeded with an APA; typically a lower number than the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP), and historically the majority of MAP cases relate to transfer 
pricing.20 
 
 
law: the case of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines” (2012) Working paper 2012-05 July 2012 Max Planck 
Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. 
13 OECD 1995 Guidelines above fn 5 at 3.5. The hierarchy of methods persisted until the 2010 revision.  
14 R.S. Avid-Yonah and Z. Pouga Tinhaga “Formulary apportionment and international tax rules” in S.Picciotto  
(ed) Taxing Multinational Enterprises as Unitary Firms, (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2017). 
15 S. Picciotto, “Indeterminacy, complexity technocracy and the reform of international corporate taxation” 
(2015) Social and Legal Studies 165 179. 
16 J.M. Calderon, “European transfer pricing trends at the crossroads: Caught between globalization, tax 
competition and EC law” (2005) Intertax 103. 
17 Ernst & Young 2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing Surveys, available at 
https://www.ub.unibas.ch/digi/a125/sachdok/2012/BAU_1_5682903_2005_2006.pdf  
18 M.A. Kane “Transfer pricing, integration and synergy intangibles: a consensus approach to the arm’s length 
standard” (2014) World Tax Journal 290. 
19 D. Ring “On the Frontier of procedural innovation: advance pricing agreements and the struggle to allocate 
income for cross border taxation” (2000) Michigan Journal of International Law 143. 
20 H. Rogers and L. Oats “The use of Advance Pricing Agreements in transfer pricing management” [2013] BTR 
76. APAs are becoming more prevalent, for example a 2017 survey by Ernst & Young reports that some 38% of 
respondents have used APAs of one form or another to increased certainty and prevent controversy, see 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-transfer-pricing-controversy-avoidance-and-
resolution/$FILE/ey-transfer-pricing-controversy-avoidance-and-resolution.pdf . Ryding records a sharp 
increase in APAs across the European Union from 399 at the end of 2013 to 2,1053 at the end of 2016, Tax 
Sweetheart Deals between multinationals and EU countries at record high, Eurodad, available at 
https://eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546881-tax-sweetheart-deals-between-multinationals-and-eu-countries-at-record-
high.pdf  
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The 2010 revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines reiterated “support for the consensus on the use 
of the arm's length principle.”21Although much was unaltered, changes included: profit split methods 
no longer being described as the method of last resort, a new chapter on business restructuring and 
new guidance on comparability. This was against a backdrop of the continued rise in integrated 
MNEs, an increasingly complex system to try to address this22 and increased e commerce and 
digitalization.23 Following the financial crisis there was rising media attention and scrutiny of high-
profile cases of corporate tax avoidance in both the US24 and the UK, including for example, publicity 
of Starbucks’ low corporation tax payments in the UK.25 
 
The continuing media reports of alleged corporate tax avoidance, and the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and its impact on public finances, led to the calling by the G20 for further work26 and the 
initiation of the Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013, carried out through the 
OECD, although with the involvement and growing prominence of non-OECD members including 
India and China27. The ALP had been targeted by some of the most vocal critics of corporate tax 
avoidance as a facilitator of profit shifting by MNEs, so it was politically imperative that transfer 
pricing was one of the main areas of focus of BEPS28 . The final BEPS report in 2015 included 
significant transfer pricing measures included templates for transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country reports. However, it did not set out measures to address the lack of comparables, 
and complexity arising from the fact intensive nature of transfer pricing. 
 
This charting of transfer pricing developments provides the context and backdrop against which the 
research interviews took place. Subsequently in 2017 the OECD released amended OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines29 consolidating the BEPS amendments. There was also a restatement of support for 
the ALP and a rejection of FA as  
“the adoption of alternative bases for transfer pricing, like formulary apportionment, would 
require development of an international consensus on a number of key issues, which 
countries do not believe to be attainable in the short or medium term.”30  
In addition, the 2017 revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines authorise tax authorities to 
recharacterize transactions and introduce more complex analysis requirements, for example in relation 
to risk and capital.31 New guidance on group synergies effectively changes the object of inquiry from 
what unrelated parties would charge, to what the particular related parties in question would charge. 
 
21 (OECD, 2010 3 1.32).  OECD, (1995). Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax 
administrations 2017. Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris: OECD Publishing (2017). 
22 M.P. Devereux and J. Vella. (2014). “Are we heading towards a tax system fit for the 2st century?” (2014) 
Fiscal Studies 449. 
23M.P. Devereux and J. Vella. (2017). “Implications of digitalization for international corporate tax reform” 
[2017] OUCBT WP17/07; O. Mazur “Transfer pricing challenges in the cloud” (2016) Boston College Law 
Review 643. 
24 See for example Y.Brauner, “BEPS: an interim evaluation” (2014) World Tax Journal 10; this highlights 
publicity for Apple, Microsoft and Google. 
25 See for example J. Thompson and V. Houlder “Starbucks faces boycott calls over tax affairs” (2012) 
Financial Times 17 October 2012 available at www.ft.com/content/5cd14dcc-187f-11e2-8705-00144feabdc0    
26 I. Young “BEPS and beyond,” (2018) TAXline, April 2018. 
27  Brauner above fn 24. 
28 R.S Collier and J.L. Andrus,Transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
29 Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations 2017. Report of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris: OECD Publishing. 2017. 
30 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm (accessed on7 October 2018). The 2017 United 
Nations Transfer Pricing Manual similarly endorses the ALP and largely follows the OECD BEPS project 
recommendations.  
31 Collier & Andrus above fn 28 see this as particularly problematic  stating that ‘if these issues are not 
addressed, this will accelerate the tax drivers to the cross-border mobility of capital, accelerate and expand the 
problems related to the taxation of digital businesses, and thereby present huge problems for the system of 
transfer pricing and the ALP, and for the existing international tax system as a whole.’295 
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32While aiming to correct the information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities, the 
complexity of the revised guidelines will create new challenges, and strain on resources, for tax 
administrations of all levels of sophistication, but particularly for developing countries. Many issues 
remain unresolved, for example the role of the ALP in evaluating capital structures.  
 
Calls for formulary apportionment 
An alternative way to determine the allocation of profits to each taxing jurisdiction is a formulary 
approach, not based on hypothetical prices for individual transactions, but on sharing profits between 
the different taxing jurisdictions according to a predetermined formula. In 2001, the European 
Commission proposed to abolish the existing separate accounting system within the EU and to 
introduce formulary apportionment: the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). A 
three-factor formula was proposed, similar to the US state apportionment factors. This is one of a 
range of possible methods that could be used to determine the allocation of profits to taxing 
jurisdictions and, in this article, we use formulary apportionment as an umbrella term for an approach 
that applies a predetermined formula to the profits of a multinational group. 
 
The profile of such an alternative approach is increasing, despite continuing pronouncements from the 
OECD supporting the ALP. There has been a growing criticism of the ALP from academic 
commentators and an increasing focus on formulary apportionment, with the discussion having 
evolved rapidly in recent years33 giving rise to a substantial body of scholarship.34 Much of the 
increasing focus on formulary apportionment stems from empirical evidence of distortions and 
income shifting under the ALP35  leading to the charge of extreme inequity. The potential for income 
shifting under the ALP can give rise to scope for zero taxation, or “homeless income,”36 a 
phenomenon that, it has been observed “does not provoke taxpayer complaints.”37 Many 
commentators argue that formulary apportionment reduces the incentive and ability to locate taxable 
income in low tax countries thereby curbing tax base erosion  and preventing tax avoidance: “the core 
reason for considering a formulary approach is prevention of tax avoidance”38  
 
 
32 J. Osborn and E.Khripounova, “Advance Pricing Agreements in the Post-BEPS Era”, 2016 Tax Notes 150(19) 
1179. 
33  M. Ylönen and T. Teivainen. “The Politics of Intra-firm Trade: Corporate price -planning and the double role 
of the arm’s length principle” (2017) New Political Economy 451.R.D.Bucks ”The case for worldwide unitary: 
stronger and better than ever” (2019) Tax Notes. 
34 See for example: Picciotto above fn  6; R.S. Avi-Yonah “The rise and fall of arm’s length: a study of the 
evolution of US international tax” (1995) Virginia Tax Review  90; F. Vincent, “Transfer pricing and attribution 
of income to permanent establishments: the case for systemic global profit splits (just don’t say formulary 
apportionment)” (2005) Canadian Tax Journal 409.; K. Clausing and R.S. Avi-Yonah “Reforming corporate 
taxation in a global economy; a proposal to adopt formulary apportionment” (2007) Discussion paper, the 
Hamilton Project The Brookings Institute; Mazur above fn 23; R.S Avi-Yonah, K.A. Clausing and M. Durst, 
“Allocating business profits for tax purposes: a proposal to adopt formulary profit split” (2009), Florida Tax 
Review, 497;Devereux and Vella above fn 22. 
35 See for example: R De Mooji and S.Ederveen “Will corporate income taxation survive?” (2008) De economist 
227; H. Huizing and L.Laeven, L. “International Profit Shifting Within Multinationals: A Multi-Country 
Perspective” Journal of Public Economics 1164; K. Clausing “The US state experience under formulary 
apportionment: are there lessons for international taxation?” (2016) National Tax Journal 353. The OECD has 
recently published a Corporate Tax Statistics Database in response to concerns elicited during consideration of 
BEPS Action 11 about the difficulties in measuring profit shifting, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/corporate-tax-statistics-database.htm.  
36B. Wells and C. Lowell, “Tax base erosion and homeless income: collection at source is the linchpin” (2011) 
Tax Law Review 535. 
37 J.  Fleming, R. Peroni and S. Shay. “Formulary Apportionment in the US International tax system: Putting 
Lipstick on a Pig” (2014) Michigan Journal of International Law 1. 
38 M. Durst “The tax policy outlook for developing countries: reflections on international formulary 
apportionment” (2015) ICTD working paper 32. 
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The dissatisfaction with the ALP, on the basis that it facilitates tax avoidance, links to the increasing 
concern about inequity with a particular focus on developing countries’ eroded tax base.39 Lower 
income counties are generally more dependent, relative to other counties, on revenues from corporate 
tax40 Furthermore, developing countries are disadvantaged because of a lack of public data on 
comparable enterprises41 and their domestic tax administrative controls and enforcement mechanisms 
may be under resourced in the face of aggressive transfer pricing challenges42  
 
Proponents of formulary apportionment frequently cite instances where such an approach has 
operated for many years within a national context, including the US43, Canada44 and Germany.45 Some 
of the conclusions drawn from the work appraising formulary apportionment at a national level lend 
support to the adoption of an international formulary apportionment approach,46 although it also 
points to the scope for formulary apportionment to distort firm behaviour.47 Formulary apportionment 
may lead to factor shifting, that is, manipulation of the elements of the formula, instead of profit 
shifting;48 It is likely that new forms of avoidance would emerge49, for example with respect to the 
sales factor which can be inflated through the inclusion of, for example, hedging transactions.50 
Furthermore, it is a significant challenge to obtain international consensus to a move to a formulary 
approach, and what formula to use is recognised.  Any major change or transition to formulary 
apportionment is likely to be a long process51 with significant transaction costs52 There are also 
recurring accounting concerns about the measurement of the formula components, the profits that 
form the tax base53 and the companies that constitute the group54.  
 
39  See for example Durst fn 39 above; T.  Hopper, P. Lassou and T. Soobaroyen, T. “Globalisation, Accounting 
and Developing Countries” (2017), Critical Perspectives on Accounting 125; O.J Otusanya “, The role of 
multinational companies in tax evasion and tax avoidance: The case of Nigeria” (2011) Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 316. 
40 E. Crivelli,,R. De Mooji and M.  “Base Erosion, Profit shifting and developing countries” (2015) IMF 
Working Paper WP/15/118, International Monetary Fund, OUCBT Working paper 15/09. Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation. 
41 G. Cottani, “Formulary Apportionment: A Revamp in the Post-Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Era?” (2016) 
Intertax 755.   
42 See for example C. Emmanuel “Exploring the transfer pricing conundrum” in T Hopper, M. Tsamenyi, S 
Uddin & D Wickramashinga (Eds) Handbook of Accounting and Development, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012); Hopper, Lassou & Soobarayan, above fn 35;  Collier and Andrus, above fn 28.   
43 K. Clausing, “Lessons for international tax reform from the US State experience under formulary 
apportionment” (2014) ICTD Research report 2.  
44  J. Mintz, J. and M. Smart, “Income shifting, investment and tax competition: theory and evidence from 
provincial taxation in Canada” (2004), Journal of Public Economics 1149. 
45 N. Riedel. “The downside of formula apportionment: evidence on factor demand distortions” (2009) 
International Tax and Public Finance 236. 
46 K. Clausing, above fn 44; Mintz and Smart above fn 45. 
47 Reidel above fn 46. 
48 L. Bettendorf, M.P. Devereux, A. van der Horst, A, Loretz, and R. A. De Mooji, “Corporate tax 
harmonization in the EU” (2014), Economic Policy 537; E. Eberhartinger, and M. Petutschnig, (2017). 
“CCCTB: the employment factor game” (2017) European Journal of Law and Economics 333; Fleming, Peroni 
& Shay above fn 38. 
49 Some proponents of formulary apportionment have also highlighted the need for anti-avoidance powers to 
counter those “gaming the apportionment formulas applicable” S Picciotto 2017 Unitary Alternatives and 
Formulary Apportionment  in S. Picciotto ed Taxing Multinational Enterprises as unitary firms (Brighton: 
Institute of Development Studies, 32 
50 S-C. Chen “Tax avoidance in the sales factor: comparison between the CCCTB directive and USA’s 
formulary apportionment taxation, Indian Journal of Tax Law, 3(2). See also J. Roin “Can the Income Tax be 
Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting Unitary Formulary Apportionment,” University of Chicago Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 170, 2007, that discusses scope for factor manipulation, cited by 
Collier and Andrus above fn 28 285.  
51 Avi Yonah and Pouga Tinhaga, above fn 14. 
52 Collier and Andrus, 2017 above fn 28. 
53 Durst, 2015 above fn 39. 
54 A. Ting “Multilateral formulary apportionment model – a reality check” (2010) Australian Tax Forum 95. 
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Most proponents of formulary apportionment do not present it as a panacea to the challenges of 
international taxation, rather an approach that diminishes, rather than fully resolves, the incentive and 
opportunity for income shifting, and also the challenges of transfer pricing administration. In terms of 
transfer pricing management and administration, there is little disagreement as to the nature of the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of the ALP and formulary apportionment; rather 
disagreement stems from the weighting given to each of these. For the ALP, there is a tension 
between the ability of a broad principle to adapt to different circumstances and the complexity and 
uncertainty this brings; conversely formulary apportionment involves a tension between a more 
straightforward system that is rigid and sometimes distortive in the sense that profit allocation is no 
longer necessarily tied to broader notions of economic activity.55 The vagueness of the ALP means it 
can evolve to accommodate different circumstances and can cover very different transactions and 
situations. However, the disadvantage of such flexibility is the consequent lack of certainty as to 
whether transfer prices will be acceptable to the relevant tax authorities giving rise to uncertainty and 
the risk of double taxation. Uncertainty is largely due to the lack of comparables, and a clear standard 
for ascertaining and judging compliance, which is evidenced by “absurdly complex” documentation 
requirements56. The fact intensive nature of transfer pricing management under the ALP can lead to, 
or exacerbate, disagreement between tax authorities, leading to unpredictable double taxation. There 
is potential for formulary apportionment to give rise to double taxation, when some countries adopt 
different formulas; but it has been countered that, under a fixed formulary approach, at least any 
double tax would be predictable.57  
 
Collectively, the extant research demonstrates increasing concerns with the ALP and increasing 
favour for formulary apportionment; to what extent is this echoed among those at work at the most 
senior level in transfer pricing? 
 
 
Research methods 
 
This study draws on data from two rounds of interviews, over a 10-year time frame58. In 2006 17 
research interviews were carried out, with interviewees drawn from those working at the most senior 
level on transfer pricing, with respect to the UK and the US, seeking to gain an insight into transfer 
pricing management in practice. These interviews generated extensive data on many themes in the 
context of transfer pricing, including findings in respect of UK-US APAs, previously published in the 
Britsh Tax Review59. Given the significant changes in the international tax and transfer pricing 
environment in the years after these interviews we sought to revisit the issues discussed, a decade 
later. Requests were made to those who were still working in international tax and transfer pricing for 
a further interview. Nearly half, 8, of the 2006 interviewees agreed to be interviewed again in 
2016/17, providing an element of direct continuity to the study. The remaining second round 
interviewees were individuals identified as occupying the roles previously occupied by some of the 
 
55 Collier & Andrus above fn 28 refer in this regard to work by Dhammika Dharmapala The Economics of 
Corporate and Business Tax Reform, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 16/04, 
2016; this suggests that formulary apportionment will only address about half of the economic distortions 
arising from the existing regime and would potentially introduce new kinds of efficiency costs.  
56 Avi Yonah, Clausing & Durst above fn 35 at 6. 
57 Durst above fn 5. 
58 The first round of interviews was conducted in a six-month period starting in 2006 (the 2006 interviews) and 
in the case of the second round of interviews, (the 2016/17 interviews) most took place in 2016/17, with 3 
conducted at the start of 2018; for convenience here, we use the phrase 2016/17 interviews to refer to this round. 
Both rounds of interviews were with interviewees working at the most senior level of transfer pricing in one of 
the following key organisations: tax authorities, tax advisers, corporate taxpayers and the OECD. Of the 34 
interviews all but 5 interviews were conducted at the workplace of the interviewee (including London, 
Washington and Paris) and all but 3 of the interviews were face to face. The average length of each interview 
was approximately 65 minutes, and, with interviewees’ permission, interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
59 Rogers and Oats above fn  20. 
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2006 interviewees who had moved on. In both rounds, each interview began with an assurance of 
anonymity: interviewees were advised that quotations could be drawn on, but these would be 
unattributed. Some quotations are presented in this article to inform the discussion: these are 
anonymous, so quotes are denoted as “I-int” for a direct quote from a first-round interviewee, and  
“II-int” denotes a direct quote from a second round interviewee. The term arm’s length principle is 
preferred and used by interviewees from the UK and the OECD, while the term arm’s length standard, 
is preferred by those from the US. In the quotes presented in this article, the term ALP has been 
substituted for ALS, where necessary, both for reasons of consistency and for preserving anonymity. 
The analysis of the extensive interview data was supplemented by reviewing OECD Guidelines and 
publications, BEPS reports and practitioner publications.   
 
 
Findings and discussion 
In both 2006 and 2016/17, interviewees were asked for their views of the ALP and the potential 
alternative approach of formulary apportionment. In general, attitudes to each these approaches are 
linked: the merits and disadvantages of formulary apportionment largely link to the disadvantages and 
advantages of the ALP. Therefore, often the discussion of the advantages (and disadvantages) of a 
particular approach, can also form the basis of the discussion of potential disadvantages (and 
advantages) of the alternative approach. 
 
2006 Attitudes to the ALP: flexibility and uncertainty  
In the 2006 interviews, just over a decade after the publication of the OECD 1995 Guidelines, 
interviewees were generally supportive of the ALP, speaking positively about it. Advantages put 
forward included the principled way it took into account the economic conditions and the market, and 
its flexibility. The ALP was seen as a principled way of setting prices between related parties, 
reflecting economic reality by taking into account what unrelated parties would do in similar market 
conditions, in accordance with the OECD Guidelines. Flexibility was seen as an advantage, allowing 
the ALP to evolve over time to accommodate and respond to changes in the economy and the business 
environment:  “the whole point is to reflect what’s happening in the marketplace, the marketplace is 
always changing, and so you can’t codify it” (I-int). 
 
An interviewee described increasing acceptance of the ALP, envisaging that the application of it 
would go on to work in an improved way in the coming years:  
“the arm’s length principle is really bedding down…I think the general understanding of it 
is improving so that you get far less sort of outliers, I think its maybe less political than it’s 
been” (I-int).  
Thus, in 2006, just over a decade after the publication of the OECD Guidelines, this bedding down of 
the ALP indicated the potential for a deepening consensus on the ALP. 
 
There was recognition that, under the flexibility of the ALP, the use of a profit split method was 
becoming increasingly commonplace, despite it not being based on arm’s length comparable prices 
and the OECD’s presentation of it as the method of last resort. While this was a move away from the 
use of comparable transactions, interviewees still considered it to be consistent with the ALP. 
The rise in highly integrated, complex MNEs poses difficulties, where it is difficult to identify 
comparables for gains (or losses) from integration and so profit split was again seen as appropriate 
and consistent with the flexible ALP.  
 
In 2006, interviewees raised and discussed some problems of applying the ALP in practice, including 
problems with comparability and the consequent uncertainty as to whether prices would be deemed as 
compliant with the requirements of all countries.  
 
2006 Attitudes to formulary apportionment: inflexibility and more certainty 
The strong support for the ALP was matched by a dearth of appetite for formulary apportionment. 
Among many, there was a view that it was not worth even considering, as it would never happen: 
several interviewees dismissed it out of hand. In 2006, reasons put forward for opposition to 
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formulary apportionment included: its formulaic rather than principled approach that is not reflective 
of the market and economic circumstances of each individual taxpayer, and a lack of flexibility. Many 
interviewees in 2006 voiced reluctance to considering formulary apportionment as it was not seen as a 
principled approach reflective of an MNE’s circumstances and so dismissing it, for example: “I think 
it is calculated to be wrong all the time” (I-int). 
The flexibility of the ALP gives rise to a lack of certainty as to how it should be applied. In 2006, 
uncertainty arising from the imprecise principle was recognised by interviewees as a problem with the 
ALP, but one that was outweighed by the benefit of flexibility, and one that was anticipated would 
reduce as it bedded down. Thus, the uncertainty of the ALP was not seen as a difficult enough 
problem to merit consideration of a more certain formulary apportionment, which did not take into 
different circumstances: “because it’s formulary it applies a one size fits all which can lead to quite 
distorted results” (I-int). Interviewees recognised that the vagueness of the ALP gave rise to problems, 
for both taxpayers and tax authorities but nevertheless maintained it was the best way to determine 
how profits should be shared out within a group of MNEs.  
 
2006 Consensus 
The consensus that emerged from the 2006 interview data on formulary apportionment was that there 
was not an appetite for a change to it. Rather, the consensus that had been built around the ALP was 
seen as an obstacle to any change. After the 1995 OECD guidelines different countries had introduced 
and administered new transfer pricing approaches which meant that obtaining a level of consensus for 
future change was seen as harder than before: 
“what is different from 1995 is that most countries now have domestic legislation. Only the 
US had it in 1995. Other countries bring baggage with them. It’s possibly harder to get 
consensus now because of domestic legislation” (I-int) 
The details and formulas for a formulary method would require agreement and achieving that was not 
viewed as realistic:  
 “having tried to negotiate profit split APAs between countries, the chances of everyone 
agreeing on global formulary apportionment formula are sort of next to zero…this is cloud 
cuckoo land” (I-int). 
On the possible shift to formulary apportionment, most interviewees could not envisage the first steps 
towards this being taken. Furthermore, the US had been a key driving force behind new rules and 
guidelines in the early 1990s60 and so it was viewed as problematic for the US to be at the forefront of 
any possible move to formulary apportionment. An interviewee commented “the US can’t take the 
lead. We’ve talked the entire world on arm’s length now” (I-int). 
 
2016/17 Attitudes to the ALP: flexibility, uncertainty and increased complexity  
A decade later, an overlapping group of interviewees was again asked for their views on the ALP and 
formulary apportionment, an opportunity to gain views on the evolving ALP, with a longer period of 
experience of its operation in practice, just over 20 years after the issuing of the OECD 1995 
Guidelines, and a year after the OECD published the final BEPS report. The 2016/17 interviews took 
place against a backdrop of significant change in the transfer pricing environment, something that was 
recognised by all interviewees.  
 
In 2006 the ALP was seen as bedding down and becoming established, with a developing, deepening 
understanding of it. However, in the 2016/17 interview data, while there was still support for the ALP, 
it was more muted and more equivocal, with the initial responses evidencing less. There was 
recognition among all interviewees of the increased public concern following media reports of 
transfer pricing manipulation and tax avoidance by high profile MNEs. The ALP does not offer a set 
of rules to determine the right amount of tax with certainty. It was observed that the ALP  is “about 
understanding business and coming up with what seems fair. That’s quite hard for members of the 
public to understand” (II-int). This points to an acknowledgement of the significantly raised profile of 
transfer pricing and international tax as an issue of public attention over the preceding decade. Much 
 
60 Durst and Culbertson above fn 12 Eden, Dacin and Wan above fn 9. 
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of the complexity in transfer pricing arises largely from the flexibility of the ALP and increasing 
public scrutiny of corporate tax could be a driver for a move to a formulary approach, as that is more 
straightforward to explain. 
 
In 2006 the ALP was described as having the strength of flexibility: this view of flexibility, as an 
advantage was not stressed in 2016/17. Rather, the ALP was described in terms such as being vague 
and open to different judgements, for example: “the arm’s length principle is this phrase that 
embraces a lot of stuff” (II-int). In 2016/17, the flexibility of the ALP that had previously been 
highlighted as a strength, was viewed as challenging, giving rise to complexity: taking all the different 
circumstances, functions and risk into account was elaborate and time consuming, requiring 
increasing levels of documentation and analysis work, and uncertainty persisted. Problems that had 
previously been identified in 2006 were reiterated, particularly the lack of certainty and comparables. 
There was increased concern about uncertainty causing the “tremendous growth” (II-int) in the 
number of disputes and MAP cases, voicing the challenges on the ground, reflected in the OECD 
MAP statistics. In 2006, the system for MAP had been referred to as “log jammed” (I-int) but the 
perception of interviewees in 2016/17 was that this had worsened further. 
 
Interviewees also reported a further increased use of profit splits in practice and expressed the view 
that this was often the most appropriate and pragmatic transfer pricing approach. Thus, in the 
intervening years between 2006 and 2016, there has been a wider acceptance and use of profit split 
methods in practice and this could be seen as evidence of the flexibility of the ALP. Furthermore, 
BEPS was pointed to as a development that would result in more profit splits and so it was 
commented that “I think BEPS has made it easier, potentially, to have formulary apportionment down 
the line” (II-int). 
 
 
2016/17 Attitudes to formulary apportionment: inflexibility, more certainty and reduced complexity 
In 2016/17, interviewees expressed concerns with the problems of the ALP and a much less 
vociferous rejection of formulary apportionment compared with 2006. However, skepticism of 
formulary apportionment remained, stemming largely from issues of practicality, such as the factors 
to use and how to reach agreement. Some interviewees reiterated that formulary apportionment is not 
a principled approach; however, rather than rejecting formulary apportionment out of hand, there was 
a recognition that it was now on the agenda and there was a willingness to consider it:  
“I think global formulary apportionment could work as long as it’s based on the real value 
and the activity, and then you come back to something which is quite difficult to define”  
(II-int). 
 
In 2006/07, there was very little support for formulary apportionment, it was typically dismissed as an 
academic notion that did not merit serious consideration. Now, in 2016/17, there was a clear readiness 
to consider it, a recognition that the current system has problems, particularly with respect to dispute 
resolution, where the system is “clogged up” (II-int). It followed that formulary apportionment could 
not be automatically dismissed, and the option was now considered:  
“I think it will not come so much from the fact that the arm’s length principle doesn’t work, it 
will come from the fact that government and tax administration just couldn’t figure out a way of 
making it work in controversy. You know, in a reasonable way” (II-int)   
 
Much of the literature calling for formulary apportionment does so because under the ALP there is 
incentive for income shifting and zero taxation of some profits. Only one interviewee raised the issue 
of zero taxation, consistent with observations that taxpayers don’t complain about it61. However, there 
were recurring concerns about formulary apportionment on the grounds that it could give rise to 
double taxation, for example: 
“It doesn’t result in a nice, clean apportionment. You end up with too much, bigger chunks, going 
to numerous jurisdictions and the amount being taxed is far more than 100%” (II-int). 
 
61 Fleming, Peroni & Shay above fn 38. 
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This risk, for example when tax authorities apply inconsistent formulas, is acknowledged in the 
literature, tempered by some proponents of formulary apportionment with the proviso that such 
double taxation would not be uncertain.62  
 
2016/17 consensus 
In the 2016/17 interviews the consensus for the ALP that emerged was a more uneasy one than had 
been anticipated in 2006, when the ALP had been seen as “bedding down” (I-int), with increasing 
frustration with the problems of consistent and predictable application in practice. The role of 
consensus remained important. In 2006 it was pointed out that there was a growing consensus built 
round the ALP. In 2016/17 it was pointed out that there were problems associated with the ALP, but 
the ALP was difficult to change due to the consensus that had built up around it. Accordingly, in 
2016/17 the existence of the consensus was frequently given as a reason for continuing with the ALP; 
the long-standing consensus for the established ALP meant it was difficult move away from it.   
 
A shift to an increased openness to the possibility of formulary apportionment in 2016/17 was also 
associated with an increased discussion of its practical challenges, which were discussed in much 
more detail than 2006. Concerns were raised about the selection and use of specific formulas, 
highlighting the recurrent tension between flexibility (giving rise to complexity) and simplicity, 
(arising from inflexibility).  Also, the potential for tax avoidance under formulary apportionment, for 
example by factor-shifting, was raised by all interviewees. The potential for factor shifting had been 
mentioned in 2006 but in less detail, largely because many had dismissed formulary apportionment as 
not meriting discussion.  
 
2016/17 Formulary approaches in practice 
Interviewees gave examples of where an apportionment approach was followed in practice, in 
particular increased use of a profit split approach. An interviewee linked the increased use of profit 
splits to formulary apportionment: 
“more widespread use of profit splits would inevitably lead to formulary apportionment. All 
formulary appointment is, is an administrative and simplified version of profit split” (II-int). 
 
Furthermore, over time, precedents and accepted practice have settled on approaches, that are 
formulary in nature, in line with views that paying attention to using apportionment for individual 
remedies, rather than in a standard way is a sensible way forward63 Gradually, over time aspects of a 
profit split approach, such as a certain percentage, become accepted as appropriate. As there is an 
increasing body of experience of what tax authorities deem to be acceptable, such informal precedents 
are increasingly followed and so reinforced, rather than following a principled approach that reflects 
specific circumstances and market reality. For example, one interviewee explained: 
“I think we’ve already been telling clients you’ve got to be consistent, but now you’re almost 
forcing consistency where they’re not consistent because it’s too dangerous to have different 
margins and stuff even when the facts are different. So, you sort of end up perhaps with a bit of 
formulary apportionment, or a safe harbor think, ‘Right, ok, we’re just going to put all our 
distributors on three per cent, or whatever, regardless.’ So people are thinking of ways of how 
they deal with that. So, it’s probably getting to more consistency and more simplicity” (II-int). 
This illustrates that sometimes transfer pricing management is not always undertaken on a case-by-
case basis, with consideration of all the specific facts, but rather with reference to precedents of what 
has previously been treated as acceptable, to minimize the risk of scrutiny and investigation from the 
tax authorities. Other interviewees referred to this, for example another interviewee commented:  
“basically, we already have some form of formulary apportionment. These methodologies say, 
‘Distributors get three per cent.’ There you go, there’s a formula. So basically, we are backing 
into this” (II-int). 
 
62 Durst, 2015 above fn 39. 
63 S. C. Morse, “Revisiting global formulary apportionment” (2010) Virginia Tax Review 593. 
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A further example offered of a formulary approach being adopted related to the intellectual property 
in an integrated MNE, the patent box rules in the UK. This is “a very straightforward, simple cost 
apportionment, where you don’t actually look at value that’s been embedded” (II-int), rather than an 
approach based on the development costs incurred in each jurisdiction. 
 
Therefore, despite recent transfer pricing rules and OECD pronouncements reiterating the ALP, there 
is an increasing number of situations where, when determining transfer prices, a formulary approach 
is used, either through the requirements of the law, or because an approach has become accepted over 
time. This can be seen as evidence of the flexibility of the evolving ALP, however such instances 
could also be seen as not fully consistent with the overarching, principled approach of the ALP, that 
takes into account different circumstances and the market and economic conditions. Each of these 
different instances of acceptance of a formulary approach could be seen as possible step towards a 
wider adoption of formulary apportionment and an indirect way to build some consensus on 
formulary apportionment more broadly. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article contributes new insights based on empirical data to the on-going debate about the 
workability of the ALP, and the potential alternative approach of formulary apportionment, by 
exploring the views and perspectives of senior transfer pricing professionals. Our interviewees were 
drawn from the most senior professionals working in the UK and US tax settings and the significant 
overlap of interviewees in 2006 and 2016/17 offers evidence of shifting attitudes towards the ALP and 
formulary apportionment, as the transfer pricing environment evolves. This information was garnered 
from a hard-to-reach group, providing new insights into changing attitudes towards the acceptability 
of different transfer pricing approaches. 
 
Over the timeframe of the study, the related academic literature reflects a rising disillusionment with 
the ALP, rooted in concerns about tax avoidance, and a move along the continuum towards formulary 
apportionment, notwithstanding the acknowledgement of some disadvantages of this approach. A shift 
in this direction is echoed in the practitioner interview data, albeit starting from a different position on 
this continuum. In the main, the data evidence a consensus that, in 2016/17, the ALP is seen as 
increasingly problematic, and there is now a willingness to consider formulary apportionment, 
perhaps facilitating future changes in attitude and practice. However, this is driven less by concerns 
about inequitable income shifting, and more by frustration with the complexity and problems of the 
workability of the ALP in practice.  
 
Consensus and the need for agreement is a recurring theme both in the literature and the interview 
data. In 2006, the ALP was presented as a principled, flexible approach, and consensus had built 
around it. In 2016/17, despite recurring problems with the ALP, and the principled approach not 
working as well as had been anticipated, the consensus was now seen as a reason to retain it, rather 
than making a major change that would “squander that valuable consensus”64. Accordingly, the 
consensus that was previously built up for the ALP, is now used as a reason to keep the ALP, even 
though the ALP is not now fully operating in the way that was envisaged when the consensus was 
being built up. This longstanding, sometimes uneasy consensus for a vague principle can be seen as 
an important, enduring counter argument to the lack of consensus on formulary apportionment both as 
a general approach, and more specifically regarding the specific formula to be used. 
 
In the years covered by this study, there have been increasing calls for formulary apportionment by 
academic commentators. However, despite this discussion and increase in the academic literature on 
formulary apportionment, it is observed that a shift towards formulary apportionment would require 
“a wrench to the mindset of many international tax professionals.”65 This longitudinal study of 
 
64 Kane above fn 18. 
65 S. Picciotto “Introduction” in in S. Picciotto (ed)  Taxing Multinational Enterprises as Unitary Firms, 
(Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2017) 2. 
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international tax professionals shows that, while a wrench has not taken place, there is evidence to 
indicate incremental steps towards a change in the mindset, to view formulary apportionment more 
positively and to make more use of formulary approaches in practice. While showing an increasing 
openness to consider formulary apportionment, the interview data also identified senior practitioners’ 
areas of concern with the ALP and formulary apportionment. This offers particular areas for attention, 
where proponents of formulary apportionment could focus, in order to acknowledge and address those 
concerns, and press their argument for formulary apportionment. Only time will tell whether these 
arguments will prevail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
